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Introduction
The rise of the New Left in the 1980s and the radical right in the 1990s has been 
widely interpreted as the demise of class politics. Contrary to the established 
parties, these new movements were seen as no longer relying on particular social 
groups, but as attracting a broad range of citizens on the basis of their values and 
attitudes (e.g., Dalton 1996: 332). Taking up the issues of New Politics, these 
new parties exploit a conflict based on cultural values, which—unlike the mater-
ial interests drawing the older political divides—were seen to be no longer 
rooted in different social positions. Likewise, the concept of cleavage—central 
to the understanding of Old Politics—no longer appeared to make sense with 
respect to these merely value- based parties.
 This chapter fundamentally disagrees with this interpretation and argues that 
the New Left and the radical right form the opposite poles of a full- grown cleav-
age in Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) sense. This means that their voters combine—
alongside shared values and a common organization—a structural element, 
namely a common position within the employment structure. The constituencies 
of the New Left and the radical right thus not only disagree over issues of iden-
tity and community but they also feature very different socio- demographic pro-
files. This implies that voters’ values are no more distributed randomly across 
the electorate in New Politics than they were in earlier times, but still remain 
firmly anchored in the social structure.
 What has changed is that the rise of the New Left and—a decade later—the 
radical right triggered a process of electoral realignment where old ties between 
groups and parties became loose and were replaced by new ties. With respect to 
the New Left and the radical right, this means that their voters do not only take 
opposite stances over cultural issues, they also present the mirror image of each 
other in terms of class and education. The highly educated professionals and 
semi- professionals in health care, teaching, social welfare and the media dispro-
portionately vote for the New Left, whereas the radical right receives dispropor-
tionate support from production workers, artisans and small business owners 
who rarely hold degrees beyond upper- secondary schooling.
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 Exclusively focusing on the demand side of politics, this chapter aims to 
unearth empirically the class pattern underlying the cultural conflict—and thus 
to analyze the micro- foundations of the cleavage between the New Left and the 
radical right. It does so for four small affluent West European countries where 
the New Left and the radical right have succeeded in the 1990s to establish 
themselves firmly in the party system: Austria, Denmark, Norway, and Switzer-
land. Our empirical analysis is based on individual- level data stemming from the 
first four rounds of the European Social Survey, covering the period between 
2002/2003 and 2008/2009. The combination of four survey rounds affords us 
with large national samples of between 3,000 and 5,000 voters and permits us to 
go beyond simplistic (and outdated) class measures that just separate the working 
from the middle class.
 Our chapter is structured as follows. Section two examines the critical junc-
ture giving way to the new cultural cleavage and sketches out its underlying 
class pattern. Section three presents the data and discusses issues related to 
measuring class position and political preferences. Section four shows the empir-
ical evidence on the ties between social structure and party choice. Section five 
then adds further results on the link between class position, economic and cul-
tural preferences, and party vote. Section six concludes by putting the principal 
findings into a wider context.
The class pattern of the cultural cleavage
In political science and sociology, two misunderstandings about class voting 
stubbornly linger on. The first misunderstanding consists in reducing class voting 
to the phenomenon of industrial workers supporting leftist parties. As the link 
between the working class and labour parties has weakened in some countries 
(although not in others), some scholars announced the end of class voting (e.g., 
Franklin et al. 1992; see also Dalton 1996; Clark and Lipset 2001). However, 
workers’ voting for the left is just one instance of class voting; it has—deserv-
edly—received much attention because it overlaps with Europe’s central polit-
ical conflict of the last 120 years, the capital–labour cleavage. Yet several 
authors correctly pointed out that class voting simply implies the presence of 
systematic links between voters’ class location and the parties they choose—
which classes are linked with which parties is then an empirical question (Müller 
1999; see also Evans 2000; Goldthorpe 2000).
 A second misunderstanding is to limit the influence of a voter’s class position 
to his or her economic preferences. As opposed to the approach suggested by a 
narrow Marxist interpretation of class, we argue that an individual’s experience 
at work—insertion into the hierarchy, demand on skills, and interactions with 
colleagues, clients, and petitioners—contributes to shape his or her attitudes 
towards material and cultural issues, involving both questions of economy and 
identity. The idea is that voters generalize from one important sphere of life 
(work) to another (politics); they thus carry their occupational experiences—
their experience of autonomy and control, of reasoning and routine—over from 
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the job to the voting booth (Oesch 2006b: 267; see also Kitschelt 2010: 666; 
Kitschelt and Rehm 2011a: 6).
 It is based on these two preliminary arguments that we expect occupational 
classes to diverge in their political preferences and party choice. This leads us 
back to our main argument that the divide between libertarian- universalistic 
voters of the New Left and traditionalist- communitarian voters of the radical 
right cannot be reduced to a mere conflict over values, but is also rooted in dif-
ferent positions within the social structure. This raises the question about the 
critical juncture of this cleavage: what evolution in the market, state or society 
brought it about? In our view, affluent democracies began to witness in the 
1960s and, above all, the 1970s three socio- economic trends that created the 
potential for a new cultural divide within the electorate: (1) de- industrialization 
and service sector growth; (2) educational expansion; and (3) occupational 
upgrading (Kriesi 1999: 400; see also Bornschier 2010a: 63).
 The first and possibly decisive change was the onset of de- industrialization in 
the 1970s, leading to a continuous decline in the proportion of industrial workers 
relative to the expanding private service personnel. Creation of service jobs was 
particularly pronounced in the public sector, where the massive expansion of the 
welfare state—in health care, education and social services—also provided a 
substantial boost to female labour market participation. Over the same period, 
the democratization of access to higher education led to a gradual increase in 
new cohorts’ educational attainment. The steady growth among graduates with 
at least upper- secondary and then increasingly tertiary education was itself influ-
enced by de- industrialization: as demand for semi- skilled industrial labor dried 
up, young people reacted by staying on at school. Finally, the joint impact of 
educational growth and service sector expansion, decisively pushed by technolo-
gical change, led to the gradual upgrading of Western Europe’s occupational 
structure: the share of highly skilled jobs in the professions and management 
strongly increased at the expense of less qualified jobs in manufacturing, the 
crafts, and agriculture (Tåhlin 2007; see also Oesch and Rodriguez 2011). Above 
all in the large European countries, the flip side of the rapid transformation of 
manufacturing was mass unemployment.
 Tertiarization, educational expansion, and occupational upgrading stand for the 
transition from high industrialism to the service society. This transition has 
improved the life chances of some categories of the population, while making the 
prospects more sombre for others. Among the winners are the highly educated 
employees who took on the growing number of service jobs requiring specialized 
skills and expertise. This is particularly true for professionals and semi- 
professionals in social and cultural services: they benefited both from the opening 
up of higher education to new social categories (and new professional fields) and 
from the growth of the public sector (Kriesi 1998; see also Müller 1999). The 
expanding (semi-)professions in health care, teaching and welfare services proved 
a particularly effective channel of upward social mobility for women. The trans-
ition from an industrial to a service society afforded these occupational groups 
with relatively comfortable positions within the salaried middle class.
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 In contrast, the losers of the transition are primarily concentrated among pro-
duction workers and small business owners. These mainly masculine categories 
have lost out from educational growth and occupational upgrading and find 
themselves at the gradually less populated lower end of the class structure. Sub-
sequent structural changes in the economy—automation of manufacturing, lean 
production, outsourcing of routine activities—clearly undermined their position 
in the labor market: the evolution towards a more skill- intensive, rational and 
competitive service economy worsened their job prospects and reduced demand 
for their skills (Kitschelt 2007: 1181; see also Kriesi et al. 2008b: 4).
 Although rooted in the employment structure, this divide between winners 
and losers of post- industrialization is not primarily about the economy and the 
just distribution of resources, but about culture and the definition of identity 
(Bornschier 2010a). Hence, winners and losers do not chiefly disagree over dis-
tributive concerns but over cultural issues: the political regulation of lifestyles 
(Herbert Kitschelt’s grid dimension) and the acceptable extent of cultural diver-
sity (Herbert Kitschelt’s group dimension; see Kitschelt 2007: 1179).
 Why culture and not economics? Professionals in social and cultural services 
are wage earners without major managerial responsibilities. As they mostly work 
in the public sector, they are unlikely to take great concern over the market- 
liberal interests of capital owners and their delegates, managers. In contrast, they 
have clearly defined cultural preferences: in their daily face- to-face interaction 
with patients, students, migrants, or the elderly, they constantly deal with human 
individuality. Their work process thus mainly consists of social interactions—
teaching, nursing, counseling—which are interpersonally negotiated and require 
tolerance for cultural diversity. These communicative experiences are likely to 
give forth to a libertarian- universalistic outlook. This outlook is further enhanced 
by the fact that they mostly work outside clear- cut authority relations and enjoy 
considerable autonomy—an experience they are likely to generalize to other 
spheres of life (Kitschelt 1994: 17; see also Kriesi 1999: 169; Müller 1999: 
143–144; Kitschelt and Rehm 2011a: 6–7).
 The spearheads of libertarian- universalistic values should thus be found 
among (semi-)professionals engaged in an interpersonal work logic: medical 
doctors and nurses in health care; social workers and counselors in welfare; pro-
fessors and teachers in education; journalists and artists in the media and enter-
tainment. These members of the helping, teaching, caring, and entertaining 
occupations had already dominated the new social movements that crystallized 
in the 1970s and 1980s. By mobilizing for individual autonomy and the recogni-
tion of difference in terms of lifestyle, gender, or sexuality, they had set the 
foundation for the New Left and notably the Green parties (Kriesi 1989: 1096; 
see also Bornschier 2010a: 19).
 The reaction to the rise of the New Left came with a delay of almost a decade, 
when radical right populist parties began to surface at the end of the 1980s. In 
our view, the emergence of the radical right is best understood as the communi-
tarian counter- offensive to the universalistic values promoted by the New 
Left—as a backlash against post- industrial society and the ideas of 1968 (Ignazi 
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1992; see also Minkenberg 2001; Bornschier 2010a). Yet contrary to the offen-
sive claims put on the agenda by the New Left, the radical right found its ideo-
logical niche in rearguard action: upholding national demarcation against 
disappearing borders, defending cultural homogeneity against increasing multi-
culturalism, salvaging traditional authority against individualistic choice. The 
contrast is not limited to ideology, but also spans different organizational logics. 
While the New Left had unfolded in a bottom- up process, where citizen groups 
mobilized around specific claims that were then adopted by parties, the mobil-
ization of the radical right strongly depended on the deliberate molding of a col-
lective identity by political entrepreneurs—on the presence of the charismatic 
leader typical of populist parties (Bornschier 2010a: 35–36).
 In their rejection of cultural diversity, the radical right encountered the largest 
resonance among the main groups left out from the transition to the service 
society: production workers. The radical right’s irate resistance to elitist libertar-
ianism and its pointed defense of national traditions received as much support 
from no other class. The radical right’s authoritarian discourse probably proved 
all the more successful among production workers as their daily job routine of 
close supervision has been shown to incline them to favor close conformity with 
rules and to be distrustful of brusque change (Kohn and Schooler 1969: 671). In 
parallel, rapid educational expansion had boosted the population’s libertarian 
preferences through education’s “liberalizing effect” (Kohn and Schooler 1969: 
676). This meant that those left out from educational upgrading did not only face 
decreasing labor demand for their qualifications; they were also likely to find 
themselves at odds with growing segments of the increasingly well educated and 
libertarian citizenry, most notably with the elites in politics and the media.
 In the end, the radical right’s mobilization of production workers could only 
meet with large success because other collective identities rooted in working- 
class culture or religion had become less relevant (Andersen and Bjørklund 
1990: 214). As working- class organizations were weakened by de- 
industrialization and mass unemployment—union membership declining in most 
affluent countries after 1990 (Bryson et al. 2011: 99)—other collective identities 
such as belonging to the national community could become salient among 
workers. In other words, the political potential of the new cultural conflict could 
only unfold where the established cleavage structure left the space and did not 
succeed in organizing these new issues (Bornschier 2010a: 4).
 In any case, the new identity conflict does not unfold in a political vacuum, 
but coexists with older distributive and religious cleavages. A production worker 
may thus be torn between his economic identity as a member of the working 
class (and vote social democratic), his religious identity as a Catholic churchgoer 
(and vote Christian democratic), or his cultural identity as a proud member of 
the national community (and vote for the radical right). Party choice is then 
determined by the identity that is most salient—and the salience of identities in 
turn strongly depends on parties’ efforts to articulate conflicts and thus to mobi-
lize voters’ identities (Bornschier 2010a: 58–59). This context of cross- cutting 
cleavages also explains why class voting always contains an indeterminate 
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element: whether production workers vote for Labour or the radical right, both 
choices constitute articulate expressions of class- based preferences, where the 
former choice is based on economic and the latter on cultural preferences.
Strategy of analysis, data and measurement of key concepts
Our central argument is that the electoral competition between the New Left and 
the radical right is best understood as a cultural conflict entrenched in different 
class positions and based on opposing values. The New Left is expected to 
receive disproportionate support from (semi-)professionals in social and cultural 
services who hold libertarian- universalistic attitudes, whereas the New Right 
should primarily draw its strength from the working class—notably production 
workers—which defends traditionalist- communitarian attitudes. In order to sub-
stantiate these claims, our empirical analysis needs to establish the following 
three elements:
1 the electorates of the New Left and the radical right differ systematically in 
terms of their class constituencies;
2 these class differences in parties’ electorate go along with different cultural 
preferences;
3 these cultural preferences account to a large extent for the reason why voters 
from a given class choose either the New Left or the radical right.
These three elements will be analyzed in a comparative perspective. As our 
focus lies on the demand side of electoral politics—voters’ choices—we reduce 
variation on the supply side of party politics by selecting four small and affluent 
West European democracies where sizable parties of the New Left and the 
radical right have established themselves since the 1990s: Austria, Denmark, 
Norway, and Switzerland. While the New Left in Austria and Switzerland is rep-
resented by the Green Party, the major party of the New Left in Denmark and 
Norway features “Socialist” in its name. Yet both Denmark’s Socialist People’s 
Party and Norway’s Socialist Left Party are affiliated to the Nordic Green Left 
Alliance and occupy a similar position in the party space as the Greens in Con-
tinental Europe. Table 2.1 gives an overview of the countries’ main New Left 
and radical right parties and averages their electoral share over the national 
parliamentary elections held between 2000 and 2008. In all four countries, 
radical right parties obtained somewhat higher electoral scores than the New 
Left. While the latter’s electoral share oscillated everywhere around 10 percent, 
the radical right obtained between 13 percent (Austria and Denmark), 16 percent 
(Norway), and almost 30 percent (Switzerland) of the national votes—with 
sometimes large movements from one election to another, notably in Austria.
 Our analysis of class voting is set at the individual level and based on data 
stemming from the European Social Survey (ESS). By aggregating the four 
available rounds of the ESS (collected in 2002/2003, 2004/2005, 2006/2007, and 
2008/2009),1 we obtain large national samples of between 3,000 and 5,000 
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voters and thus cover party choice over the last decade. When comparing in 
Table 2.1 the parties’ electoral share in our sample with their effective score, we 
find radical right voters to be under- represented and New Left voters to be over- 
represented in the ESS. Under- representation of Radical Right supporters is a 
common feature of electoral surveys and has been explained both by these cit-
izens’ lower response rates and socially conformist behaviour—people avoid 
admitting that they have voted for the Radical Right (Ivaldi 2001: 55–56).
 In the ESS, respondents are asked what party they voted for in the last parlia-
mentary election. This question provides us with the dependent variable, party 
choice. Our key independent variable is voters’ class position. Drawing on a 
series of conceptual contributions (Kriesi 1989; see also Erikson and Goldthorpe 
1992; Esping- Andersen 1993; Kitschelt 1994), we try to capture the increased 
heterogeneity in the employment structure by resorting to a detailed class schema 
based on two dimensions. A first dimension distinguishes hierarchically between 
more or less advantageous employment relationships based on people’s market-
able skills. A second dimension discriminates horizontally between four differ-
ent work logics; it thus distinguishes different occupational experiences of 
otherwise similarly (dis-)advantaged classes (Oesch 2006b). When combining 
the two dimensions, we obtain the eight- class schema shown in Table 2.2. In 
order to convey an idea about the characteristics of different classes, we list for 
each class a few illustrative occupations and note the share of each class within 
Table 2.1  Countries, parties, electoral scores and observations in the ESS
Main party¹ Electoral share, 
averaged for 
National elections 
2001–2008²,³
Electoral 
share in ESS 
Sample 
2002–2008
N voters 
aggregated in 
ESS sample 
2002–2008
Austria NL: Green Party 10.3 16.0 5,875
RR: FPÖ (+BZÖ) 12.6  6.9
Denmark NL: SF (+EL) 10.3 12.0 5,685
RR: DF 13.2  8.5
Norway NL: SV (+RV) 11.9 13.8 6,472
RR: FrP 18.4 16.2
Switzerland NL: Green Party  8.5 10.7 6,390
RR: SVP 29.7 26.6
Notes
1 NL = New Left, RR = radical right.
2  Data for Austria are only available for the three first rounds (ESS02–ESS06). Accordingly, the 
effective electoral share has been calculated on the basis of the parliamentary elections 2002 and 
2006 only (without 2008).
3  Source: own calculations based on European Election Database (http://eed.nsd.uib.no).
Abbreviations
Austria—FPÖ: Austrian Freedom Party; BZÖ: Alliance for the Future of Austria.
Denmark—SF: Socialist People’s Party; EL: Red-Green Alliance.
Norway—SV: Socialist Left Party; RV: Red Electoral Alliance; FrP: Progress Party.
Switzerland—SVP: Swiss People’s Party.
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the four countries’ electorate in the 2000s, restricting our sample to national 
citizens.
 Class location is measured on the basis of the respondents’ current or past 
employment. If respondents do not mention any occupation, their class location 
is derived from their partner’s present or past employment. Once we have deter-
mined the relevant source of their employment, respondents are then allocated to 
classes based (1) on their employment status, separating employers and the self- 
employed from the much larger category of employees, and (2) on their (past or 
present) occupation, as measured by the over 400 occupational codes in the ESS 
(ISCO- 88 at 4-digit). The process followed to allocate occupations to different 
classes is described in more detail elsewhere (Oesch 2006b: 270–272).
 Alongside the class variable, we construct two composite indices to capture 
citizens’ preferences on an economic- distributive and a cultural- identitarian axis. 
For each of the two axes, we select four questions that seem, from a theoretical 
point of view, well suited to translate the underlying attitudes towards economic 
redistribution and cultural diversity. We then run first a factor analysis on eco-
nomic attitudes by using the following four items (factor loadings decreasing in 
this order): (1) standard of living for the unemployed is government’s respons-
ibility; (2) Standard of living for the old is government’s responsibility; (3) a job 
for everyone is government’s responsibility; (4) government should reduce dif-
ferences in income levels. This index gives us a measure for an economic axis 
going from a socialist to a capitalist pole.
 We then run a second factor analysis on cultural attitudes by using another 
four items (factor loadings again decreasing in this order): (1) a country’s cul-
tural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants; (2) immigrants make a 
country a worse or better place to live in; (3) gays and lesbians should be free to 
live as they wish; (4) European unification has gone too far or should go further. 
This measure gives us a proxy for the cultural dimension underlying the politics 
of identity and community, which stretches from a libertarian- universalistic to 
an authoritarian- communitarian pole. By combining the attitudes on the two 
axes, we are able to determine voters’ position in a two- dimensional political 
space as sketched out, among others, by Herbert Kitschelt (Kitschelt 1994: 27). 
The factor loadings of these two composite indices countries are shown in Tables 
A2.1 and A2.2 in the Appendix. Note that in both cases, one single factor 
explains over 90 percent of the variance in the items.2
Results for class voting
Our analysis starts with a look at the class basis of the New Left and the radical 
right in the four countries under study. Figure 2.1 presents the proportion in each 
class voting for either the New Left or the radical right, where horizontal bars to 
the left imply less- than-average support and bars to the right more- than-average 
support (blank bars mean not significantly different from the average). Only one 
class stands out as lending disproportionate support to the New Left: socio- 
cultural (semi-)professionals. Would the electorate entirely consist of this new 
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and still growing class, the New Left would obtain between 22 percent and 33 
percent of all votes in the four countries under study—at least twice its effective 
electoral score. In contrast, production workers are very unlikely to support the 
New Left: among production workers, the New Left receives one out ten votes at 
best (Denmark), and one out of twenty- five votes at worst (Switzerland). In 
Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland, production workers are joined by small busi-
ness owners and clerks, who also manifest very little sympathy for the New Left.
 When turning to the radical right, we find production workers to be its strong-
est supporters in all four countries: 30 percent among them vote for Norway’s 
Progress Party and even 40 percent for the Swiss People’s Party. In Denmark, 
Norway, and Switzerland, the radical right is also particularly successful in 
obtaining the support of service workers—the newer and more feminine com-
ponent of the working classes. On the contrary, the radical right does not hold 
much appeal for socio- cultural (semi-)professionals. Were it only for this class, 
the radical right parties under study would be condemned to an insignificant 
minority status. Quite generally, the radical right receives lower- than-average 
support from the (upper)-middle classes, be they salaried (socio- cultural and 
technical professionals as well as managers) or self- employed (liberal profes-
sionals and large employers).
 In sum, Figure 2.1 shows the class constituencies of the New Left and the 
radical right to present the almost exact mirror image of each other. Moreover, 
there is a striking similarity in the class pattern across countries: despite differ-
ences in their institutions, party systems, and political culture, we find in all four 
countries the same classes to rally behind the radical right and avoid the New 
Left (production workers and small business owners), as to support the New Left 
and to shun the radical right (socio- cultural professionals).
 That these differences in electoral shares are not irrelevant becomes clear 
when we adopt a compositional perspective and disaggregate each camp’s elec-
torate according to class. Figure 2.2 shows that the New Left depends much 
more than the radical right on the votes of professionals: in all four countries, 
socio- cultural, technical, and liberal (semi-)professionals represent at least 40 
percent of the New Left’s voters, but 18 percent at most of those of the radical 
right. In contrast, clerks, production, and service workers—three categories 
without secure middle- class status—make up two- thirds of the radical right’s 
electorate as compared to only 40 percent of the New Left in Austria, Denmark, 
and Norway. In Switzerland, the electoral relevance of the working classes is 
much smaller than in the other three countries because of a disproportionate 
share of—disenfranchised—immigrant workers. Yet the differences in the party 
constituencies are no less striking: the Swiss People’s Party receives 44 percent 
of its votes from production workers, service workers, and clerks, as compared 
to only 18 percent from (semi-)professionals. The opposite is true for the New 
Left: 51 percent of its electorate are (semi-)professionals, but only 17 percent are 
production workers, service workers, and clerks. The New Left thus relies in all 
four countries on the middle classes, whereas the radical right is clearly domi-
nated by the working classes.
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Figure 2.1  The electoral score of the New Left and the radical right by class in the 
2000s.
Notes
Blank columns signify that the electoral scores of these classes are not statistically different from the 
party’s total score in the electorate. Statistical significance is based on t-tests and p < 0.05.
N: Austria: 3,458; Denmark: 4,848; Norway: 5,074; Switzerland: 3,202.
42  
 An open question is whether the relationship between particular classes and 
political parties still holds once we take into account other individual character-
istics such as gender, age or education. The electorates of the New Left and the 
radical right diverge much more in terms of gender than do those of the old left 
and the center right. In all four countries, the New Left attracts significantly 
more support from women than men, whereas the radical right is everywhere 
more successful among men than women. The gaps are particularly marked for 
Norway’s Socialist Left Party at the one extreme (obtaining 10 percent of male 
and 18 percent of female votes) and the Austrian Freedom Party at the other (9 
percent of male and 5 percent of female votes); but gender differences are by no 
means limited to these two parties—quite to the contrary, the parallels between 
countries are again remarkable.3
 The two party families also diverge with respect to age. The New Left 
presents everywhere the youngest electorate, whereas the radical right has, on 
average, the oldest voters in Austria and Denmark and the second oldest in 
Norway and Switzerland. However, more relevant for the understanding of the 
new cultural conflict than age is education. Figure 2.3 shows that the relation-
ships between educational attainment and party choice go into opposite direc-
tions for the New Left and the radical right. While support for the New Left rises 
steeply with increasing education, endorsement of the radical right drops with 
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Figure 2.2 The class composition of the electorate of the New Left and the radical right.
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rising education. As a result, citizens with no more than lower- secondary school-
ing are more likely to vote for the radical right than the New Left in all four 
countries, whereas holders of tertiary degrees give everywhere stronger support 
to the New Left than the radical right. These different propensities to vote for 
either party are also reflected in the composition of the respective electorates. In 
Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland, over 40 percent of the New Left’s voters 
went to university or technical college as compared to less than 16 percent 
among radical right voters.
 What happens to class once we control for differences in gender, age, and 
education? The results of multinomial regressions on party choice suggest that in 
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all four countries, the class effect on party choice becomes weaker once we 
account for years of education (and the somewhat less consequential variables of 
gender and age). Yet in all four countries socio- cultural professionals remain 
nonetheless significantly more likely to vote for the New Left—as do production 
workers, together with service workers in Austria, Denmark, and Norway, to 
vote for the radical right than the reference category of (associate) managers.4 
Hence, although every additional year of education tips the balance away from 
the radical right toward the New Left, voters’ class position continues to play a 
central role. Managers and socio- cultural professionals may have similar levels 
of education; their diverse occupational experiences still set them apart in terms 
of economic and cultural preferences. In any case, the temptation to play off 
class against education is somewhat academic as the two concepts are closely 
linked: access to several classes such as the socio- cultural and technical profes-
sions depends upon the successful completion of higher education: being a 
medical doctor, a lecturer or an engineer presupposes the existence of a tertiary 
degree. In contrast, class positions in routine production or service work make 
the possession of advanced education unlikely, as it is neither requested nor put 
to effective use in the job.
 We try to make the results from multinomial regression accessible by calcu-
lating the predicted probabilities to support either the New Left or the radical 
right for the average voter: a man aged forty- five years, who either works as a 
socio- cultural professional or a production worker. Figure 2.4 shows that even 
when age and gender are held constant, the two classes strongly diverge in their 
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party choice. Among middle- aged male socio- cultural professionals, between 19 
percent (Switzerland) and 29 percent (Austria) vote for the New Left, but only 
between 3 percent (Austria) and 14 percent (Switzerland) for the radical right. In 
contrast, middle- aged men employed as production workers are much less likely 
to support the New Left than the radical right. Differences are largest in Norway 
and Switzerland, where only 8 percent and 4 percent respectively vote for the 
New Left, but 31 percent and 43 percent vote for the radical right. The large dif-
ferences between these two classes are not trivial, as socio- cultural professionals 
account for about 15 percent (tendency rising) and production workers for about 
20 percent (tendency falling) of the electorate.
The cultural and economic preferences linking classes and 
parties
So far, our analysis has been limited to structural determinants of voting for the 
New Left or the radical right. However, the concept of cleavage implies the 
existence of a shared normative element—a common set of values—which pro-
vides a sense of identity to citizens’ socio- structural position and thus converts it 
into voting (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 199). In other words, values and attitudes 
should pick up the class effect and translate it into party choice. Accordingly, we 
integrate voters’ economic and cultural preferences into our analysis of the link 
between class location and party choice. We do so by constructing a two- 
dimensional political space, as sketched out, among others, by Kitschelt 
(Kitschelt 1994: 27; see also Kriesi et al. 2008b: 13). The horizontal axis distin-
guishes voters’ attitudes towards the economy, going from a redistributive 
socialist pole to a free- market capitalist pole. The vertical axis separates voters 
according to their attitudes towards the political regulation of lifestyles and cul-
tural diversity, going from a libertarian- universalistic to an authoritarian- 
communitarian pole.
 Based on the factor analyses discussed above, we plot voters’ preferences on 
the economic and cultural axes into the two- dimensional political space shown 
in Figure 2.5. While we calculate voters’ mean preferences at the level of both 
occupational classes and party families, it is important to note that our analysis 
only carries on the electoral demand side: we depict parties’ positions on the 
basis of their mean voter’s economic and cultural preferences, and not on the 
basis of parties’ programmes or stances over specific issues. Three findings in 
Figure 2.5 are noteworthy.
 First, at the party level, we find voters of the radical right to occupy in all four 
countries the authoritarian- communitarian extreme of the cultural preference axis. 
While they differ very little from center- right voters in terms of economic prefer-
ences, sharing the same (Austria and Denmark) or almost the same (Norway and 
Switzerland) position on the state- market axis, they take a markedly more authorit-
arian stance over cultural issues. In consequence, they are at greatest variance with 
the New Left’s electorate, which clusters at the libertarian- universalistic end of the 
cultural preference axis. While voters of the New Left are as strongly in favor of 
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economic redistribution as the old left’s electorate, they occupy culturally a much 
more libertarian position everywhere, except in Switzerland where the Social 
Democratic Party also adopted the claims of the new social movements. In the 
other three countries, the electorates of the two dominant party families, the old 
left and the center right, only disagree over economic issues, but share a similarly 
centrist position on cultural issues related to immigration, homosexuality, and 
European integration. This suggests that the two old party families mainly oppose 
each other over an economic conflict (‘Old politics’), whereas the two new party 
families collide over a cultural divide (‘New Politics’).
 Second, at the class level, socio- cultural professionals stand out as being particu-
larly libertarian. In all four countries, they occupy the libertarian- universalistic end 
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the two axes. Three relatively small classes have not been included into the graphs: clerks, technical 
specialists, and liberal professionals/large employers.
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of the cultural axis, and are thus a good distance away from the other large cat-
egory of the salaried middle class: (associate) managers. While socio- cultural 
professionals also take a more leftist stance over economic issues, what sets 
them apart is their cultural libertarianism. The opposite—authoritarian—end of 
the cultural axis is occupied by small business owners, service workers, and, 
above all, production workers. No other class has preferences so traditionalist- 
communitarian as production workers in our four countries. Interestingly, pro-
duction and service workers are close to the old left in terms of economic 
attitudes. What moves them into the vicinity of the radical right are their cultural 
preferences. The radical right thus seems to secure the support of large working- 
class segments not thanks to its market- liberal program, but despite it (Ivars-
flaten 2005; see also Oesch 2008). Depending on whether economic or cultural 
issues are more salient, production and service workers are likely to vote either 
for the old left or the radical right.
 Third, it is remarkable how much alike the political space looks in the four 
countries under study. Even though we run a separate factor analysis for each 
country, we obtain striking cross- country similarities in both economic and cul-
tural preferences of party families and occupational classes. We find it difficult to 
attribute these parallels to a different explanation than to political conflicts rooted 
in the social structure—to cleavages. If attitudes were distributed randomly across 
the electorate, we would certainly not expect such large commonalities in the cul-
tural and economic preferences of occupational classes across countries. Note also 
that individual- level analyses based on different data (and somewhat different class 
measures) report very similar spatial configurations of the electorate in Denmark 
(Harrits et al. 2009) and Switzerland (Oesch and Rennwald 2010).
 In a last set of analyses, we estimate nested multinomial regressions on the 
determinants of choosing the radical right over the New Left. The objective is to 
determine the extent to which economic and cultural preferences account for the 
class differences in party choice. We examine four different models: Model 1 
only includes the socio- demographic variables of gender, age, education, and 
class. Model 2 adds (and then removes) economic preferences, whereas Model 3 
adds (and then removes) cultural preferences. Finally, Model 4 includes both 
economic and preferences together with socio- demographic determinants. Since 
we only dispose of all these measures in ESS round 4 (2008/2009), these ana-
lyses are run on a restricted sample and do not include Austria. The results are 
shown in Table A2.3 in the Appendix. While they provide us with a load of 
information on the determinants of voting behavior, we only discuss a few find-
ings that seem particularly notable in the context of our study.
 To begin with, socio- cultural professionals are everywhere systematically less 
prone to vote for the radical right as compared to the New Left than all other 
classes—except liberal and technical professionals—even accounting for differ-
ences in gender, age, and education (see Model 1). Holding preferences for eco-
nomic redistribution clearly increases support for the New Left. Yet economic 
attitudes do not explain why socio- cultural professionals are more likely to 
favour the New Left over the radical right than other classes (see Model 2). 
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In comparison, cultural attitudes seem to be much more relevant for understand-
ing why some classes rally behind the New Left and others behind the radical 
right: the coefficients for cultural preferences are in all three countries larger 
than those for economic preferences, most notably so in Switzerland (see Model 
3). Once we account for voters’ cultural preferences, socio- cultural professionals 
and service workers no longer differ significantly in their party choice and also 
the differences between socio- cultural professionals and production workers 
decline substantially in the three countries under study.
 Likewise, the effect of higher education on preferring the New Left over the 
radical right seems to be channeled through cultural preferences. Hence, once we 
control for differences in voters’ cultural attitudes, the effect of education shrinks, 
and becomes even non- significant in Switzerland—yet obviously, education deter-
mines cultural preferences—and not the other way round. These results suggest 
that the effect of class and education on the new cultural conflict is mediated 
through citizens’ cultural preferences: their attitudes towards immigration, supra-
national integration, and different lifestyles. But of course, our imperfectly meas-
ured attitudes do not entirely explain why highly educated socio- cultural 
professionals are particularly likely to vote for the New Left and less qualified pro-
duction workers (as well as clerks) particularly likely to support the radical right.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the electoral competition between the New Left and 
the radical right is best understood as a cultural divide that is firmly anchored in 
different class constituencies. The argument has then been subjected to an empir-
ical analysis based on individual- level data stemming from four rounds of the 
European Social Survey. In a nutshell, our major findings can be summed up as 
follows.
 We clearly find that party choice is not distributed randomly across the elec-
torates in Austria, Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland. On the contrary, the New 
Left attracts disproportionate support from socio- cultural professionals and 
presents a clear- cut middle- class profile, where younger voters with tertiary edu-
cation are strongly over- represented, while workers, clerks, and small business 
owners are under- represented. The radical right’s constituency presents the 
mirror image of the New Left. In all four countries, the radical right is most suc-
cessful among production and service workers and receives least support from 
socio- cultural professionals. More generally, the radical right strongly depends 
on the votes of less educated men and older citizens. Radical right parties have 
thus turned into a new type of working- class party, as two- thirds of their voters 
in Austria, Denmark and Norway do not have middle- class status.
 However, the analysis of voters’ preferences suggests that the radical right’s 
success within the working class is due not to economic but to cultural issues. The 
New Left and the radical right thus collide over a cultural conflict of identity and 
community—and not over questions of market regulation and state redistribution. 
Economically, the voters of the New Left hold similar preferences as those of the 
The cleavage between New Left and radical right  
old left. Likewise, attitudes toward the economy do not differ significantly between 
the electorates of the radical right and the center right. Yet in cultural terms, the 
New Left is much more libertarian and the radical right much more authoritarian 
than the constituencies of the two established parties. The New Left and the radical 
right thus primarily compete along the cultural dimension of politics. However dif-
ferent these two camps are, both lose out—to the old left or the center right respec-
tively—if distributive issues linked to the economy are more salient in electoral 
campaigns. Likewise, they both flourish where questions related to immigration 
and cultural diversity appear more relevant to voters (Bornschier 2010a: 6). In 
other words, the success of the New Left and the radical right depends on the sali-
ence of the cultural as compared to the economic conflict.
 In short, our analysis thus suggests that a full- grown cleavage has emerged in 
the four small and affluent European countries under study, separating a 
libertarian- universalistic pole from an authoritarian- communitarian pole. The 
emergence of this new divide has been accompanied by a process of class rea-
lignment: the beneficiaries of educational expansion and occupational upgrad-
ing—notably socio- cultural professionals—have decisively contributed to the 
growth of the New Left. In contrast, those left out from the transition toward the 
knowledge and service society—notably production workers—were successfully 
recruited by the radical right.
Appendix
Table A2.1  Factor analysis for the economic preference axis
Variable Factor 1
Standard of living for the unemployed, government responsibility 0.74
Standard of living for the old, government responsibility 0.66
Job for everyone, government responsibility 0.59
Government should reduce differences in income levels 0.32
Eigenvalue 1.43
Proportion variance explained by factor 0.91
Note
N (based on ESS 2008 for CH, DK, NO): 4,820.
Table A2.2  Factor analysis for the socio-cultural preference axis
Variable Factor 1
Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants 0.82
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live 0.82
Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish 0.29
European unification should go further or gone too far 0.47
Eigenvalue 1.65
Proportion variance explained by factor 0.95
Note
N (based on ESS 2004, 2006, 2008 for AT, CH, DK, NO): 18,366.
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Notes
1 Note that Austria was only included in the first three survey rounds of the ESS, but not 
in ESS 2008/2009.
2 In order to allow for country differences in attitudes, our analyses below rely on factor 
analyses run separately by country. The attitudinal factors thus vary across countries—
although surprisingly little. Since the questions used to construct the economic axis 
were only included in the ESS 2008/09 and thus not available for Austria, Austria’s 
economic factor is based on three other questions, included in ESS2002/03: (1) govern-
ment should reduce differences in income levels; (2) the less government intervenes in 
the economy, the better for the country; (3) employees need strong trade unions to 
protect work conditions.
3 The differences in electoral scores by gender are the following.
 AT—New Left: 14 percent male, 18 percent female; radical right: 9 percent male, 
5 percent female.
 DK—New Left: 9 percent male, 13 percent female; radical right: 10 percent male, 
7 percent female.
 NO—New Left: 10 percent male, 18 percent female; radical right: 19 percent male, 
13 percent female.
 CH—New Left: 9 percent male, 13 percent female; radical right: 30 percent male, 
24 percent female.
4 The reference category is constituted of (associate) managers who vote for the center 
right. Significance levels correspond to p < 0.01. Detailed results are available from the 
author. See also Table A2.3 in the Appendix, discussed below.
